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THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: 
THE ENDURING SIGNIFICANCE OF A LEGAL CLASSIC 
Joel K. Goldstein* 
A classic, Mark Twain said, is a book everyone wants to have 
read but no one wants to read.  Alternatively, Twain described a classic 
as a work people praise but don’t read.  Twain, of course, was mocking 
social behavior, not the relatively few works that rank as classics or the 
rare authors who produce them. 
In the literature of the law, few books become classics.  The 
period over which most law books are read is depressingly brief, to 
writers of such works at least.  The life of the law may be experience, 
not logic, as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. instructed,1 but one 
consequence of writing about such a dynamic subject is that even 
profound thinkers find their work forgotten as new opinions 
subordinate earlier precedents, doctrine changes, institutional behavior 
evolves, new circumstances introduce novel problems and 
considerations, and a younger generation rebukes or forgets the 
writings of earlier times.   
Benjamin N. Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Process2 is 
an exception.  It is a legal classic.3 Those who attended Cardozo’s four 
 
*Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I am grateful to 
Sam Levine for the invitation to participate in a fascinating conference on Judge Cardozo, for 
the other participants for their illuminating papers and comments, and to Jordan Buchheit and 
Katie Finnegan for their helpful research assistance. 
1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
2 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
3 See, e.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Nature of the Judicial Process: Revisited, 49 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1989) (referring to Cardozo’s “classic essay”); Judith S. Kaye, Human Dimension 
in Appellate Judging: A Brief Reflection on a Timeless Concern, 88 CORN. L. REV. 1004, 1008 
(1987) (referring to Cardozo’s book as “classic”); Cf. Shirley S. Abramson, Judging in the 
Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 965, 968 (1993) (Wisconsin Supreme Court justice 
referring to book as “timeless”); Sol Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16 
(1990) (New York Court of Appeals Chief Justice referring to Cardozo’s book as a “seemingly 
timeless work”); Paul Brickner, How Judges Think, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793, 794 (2009) 
(referring to Cardozo’s “enduring study” and “slender classic”); See also cf. Grant Gilmore, 
The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J. 1022, 1032 (1975) (describing The 
1
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Storrs lectures at Yale Law School in 1921 or read the resulting book 
published later that year recognized as very special what they heard or 
read.  Two years after its publication, Cardozo’s successor on the 
Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter, put quotation marks around the 
lower-case words “the nature of the judicial process,”4 implicitly 
suggesting that the six words of Cardozo’s title already required such 
treatment even when not specifically referring to the book.  Frankfurter 
described the book as “a little classic” in 1958,5 a judgment Professor 
Arthur Corbin had conferred, but without the adjective, in 1939.6   
To be sure, Cardozo’s book has had its occasional detractors.  
Justice Harry Blackman first read the book “carefully” in 1975 and 
found the lectures “somewhat disappointing.”7  Very late in life, Judge 
Henry Friendly told Judge Richard A. Posner that he found Cardozo’s 
book dated and Posner himself thought it “pretty useless” as “a 
handbook of the judicial craft”8 and reported that it was “considered in 
sophisticated legal circles old hat.”9  Shortly after replacing Cardozo 
on the Supreme Court in 1939, Frankfurter found the book not helpful 
in deciding actual cases.10  A year after publishing The Death of 
Contract, the great Grant Gilmore declared the demise of The Nature 
of the Judicial Process in his 1975 Storrs Lecture.  “[N]obody reads” 
Cardozo’s book anymore, Gilmore said, which he said has “almost no 
intellectual content.”11 
 
Nature of the Judicial Process, along with Holmes’ The Common Law, as “the two most 
celebrated books in the history of American jurisprudence” though “nobody reads them and 
everybody praises them”). 
4 Felix Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes’ Constitutional Opinions, 36 
HARV. L. REV. 909, 909-10 (1923). 
5 Frankfurter often referred to Cardozo’s book in diminutive terms. See, e.g., Felix 
Frankfurter, The American Judge, 37 HARV. L. REV. 782, 782 (1924) (book review) (referring 
to Cardozo’s “exhilarating little volume”), perhaps in response to or consistent with Cardozo’s 
own reference to “my little book” in a letter of February 4, 1922 to Frankfurter, quoted in 
ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, 153, 623 n.36 (1998). 
6 Arthur L. Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 48 YALE L.J. 426, 434 
n.15 (1939). 
7 Harry A. Blackman, Notes on a Somewhat Disappointing Book, 15 GREEN BAG 2D 204 
(2012). 
8 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 19 n.38 (1990). 
9 Id. at 21. 
10 Paul A. Freund, Foreword: Homage to Mr. Justice Cardozo, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3-4 
(1979). 
11 Gilmore, supra note 3, at 1032; see also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 
76 (1977). 
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Professor Gilmore’s comment recalls the verdict of another 
great American thinker, Yogi Berra, about Ruggeri’s, a prominent 
Italian restaurant in St. Louis which opened in 1904.  “Nobody goes 
there anymore.  It’s too crowded,”12 Yogi supposedly said in the late 
1940s.  Ruggeri’s closed in 1982, but The Nature of the Judicial 
Process has endured.  Cardozo’s classic has been purchased as well as 
praised.  In 1990, Judge Posner concluded that the frequency with 
which the book is still cited confirms its status as a classic.13  The 
prominent legal historian, Morton Horwitz, wrote near the end of the 
20th century that Cardozo’s book “remained perhaps the most widely 
read American work on legal thought for over a half century.”14  In 
2013, Cardozo’s biographer, Professor Andrew Kaufman, reported 
that the work “continues to be reprinted and sold in substantial 
numbers over ninety years” after publication.15 
Nearly a century after it appeared, Cardozo’s classic, The 
Nature of the Judicial Process, should be read, as well as praised, by 
law students and their teachers, and by others who aspire to understand 
the American judicial process.  Indeed, it should be part of the common 
literature that law schools assign their students.  In part, its claim to 
continued study is historical, based on its impact on twentieth century 
legal thought and for the insights it provides about its iconic author, 
one of America’s greatest and most influential judges.  Yet it also 
presents a compelling account of common law judging and the 
common law process that, somewhat remarkably, continues to describe 
law and judging in our time as well as in Cardozo’s.  Cardozo’s book 
provides lasting insights into the challenging task assigned judges in 
the American system.  Cardozo explained how judges could help make 
a legal system remain connected to changing times and values, even 
while applying a proliferation of rules from decisions rendered in the 
past, and often the long-distant past. And he explained how judges 
could respond when legal disputes presented situations that existing 
rules don’t clearly cover.  Cardozo did not provide a neat, formulaic 
response, but his depiction took root and survived because it was 
candid, credible and pragmatic, and because it balanced the virtues of 
continuity and change.  And, perhaps not surprisingly, part of what has 
 
12 YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 16 (1998). 
13 POSNER, supra note 8, at 21. 
14 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960 THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 189 (1992). 
15 Andrew L. Kaufman, Cardozo at 100, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 183, 184 (2013).  
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made the book a classic was Cardozo’s ability to deploy virtues of the 
common law methodology to explain appellate decision-making.   
This Essay begins by describing in Section I the events leading 
to the creation of The Nature of the Judicial Process.  Section II briefly 
outlines Cardozo’s argument in the book.  Section III describes the 
reaction to Cardozo’s book, and section IV seeks to explain its 
continuing relevance. 
I. THE BACKGROUND TO THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 
The Nature of the Judicial Process grew out of Cardozo’s 1921 
Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School when Cardozo was in the eighth 
of his 18 years on the New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest 
court.  He had been elected to the New York Supreme Court in late 
1913 and took office in January, 1914, at age 43.  A few weeks later, 
Governor Martin Glynn designated Cardozo to serve temporarily on 
the New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court.  Cardozo 
was elected in 1917 for a 14-year term. 
The invitation to deliver the Storrs Lectures came in winter, 
1920.  Arthur Corbin had written about Cardozo’s opinion in DeCicco 
v. Schweizer,16 and Corbin’s scholarly article17 had generated a 
correspondence between jurist and academic.18  The Yale Law faculty 
“enthusiastically” authorized Dean (later Judge) Thomas W. Swan to 
invite Cardozo.19  Charles E. Clark, a young faculty member at Yale 
Law School at the time who became a prominent federal judge, later 
recalled the faculty’s sense that Cardozo was “not merely a good judge, 
but even more a student and scholar in the law worthy of our highest 
platform honor.”20  Cardozo initially declined the invitation to give the 
Storrs Lectures, stating “I have no message to deliver.”21  A visit of 
Cardozo with the Yale Law faculty was arranged, at which Cardozo 
 
16 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917). 
17 Arthur L. Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat Consideration? — Recent 
Noteworthy Decisions, 27 YALE L.J. 362, 362 (1918). 
18 Arthur L. Corbin, The Judicial Process Revisited: Introduction, 71 YALE L.J. 195, 196 
(1961). 
19 Id. at 197. 
20 Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie 
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946). 
21 Corbin, supra note 18, at 197; see also Corbin, supra note 6, at 434 n.15 (reporting that 
Cardozo accepted the invitation to deliver the Storrs Lecture “hesitatingly”). 
4
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repeated the declination for the same reason.  Yet at least one person 
present persisted. “‘Judge Cardozo, could you not explain to our 
students the process by which you arrive at the decision of a case, with 
the sources to which you go for assistance?” Cardozo promptly 
assented that “‘I believe I could do that.’”22 
And he did.  After a year of preparation, Cardozo performed 
his assignment.  On  successive days from February 15-18, 1921, he 
explained how he decided cases in four, hour-long lectures.23                       
Cardozo had already authored some of his greatest hits. In addition                       
to DeCicco v. Schweizer,24 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,25 and                   
Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff-Gordon26 were already in the books when the 
invitation was extended, and Jacobs and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent27 was hot 
off the press when Cardozo spoke in New Haven, having been issued 
the prior month.   
The Yale Law faculty had anticipated that Cardozo would rank 
with its prior Storrs lecturers, but surely none anticipated that his 
lectures would remain the standard nearly a century later.28  Clark, then 
a young faculty member, later recalled that none of us “was prepared 
to be so wooed and won as we were by the gentle, shy, and engaging 
personality who charmed his listeners to the point of achieving the 
supreme distinction of requiring a larger hall for his huge audience.”29 
That feat departed from normal practice which had dictated that the 
lectures drew successively smaller audiences.30 Corbin recalled that 
Cardozo’s first lecture was met with a “burst of applause that would 
not cease.”31  Attendance for the second lecture increased to such an 
extent that the lecture was moved to a hall that accommodated 500, 
twice the seating capacity of the original venue.  Even so, the larger 
hall was filled.32  Corbin reported that the audience was “spell-bound” 
for the four lectures.  Cardozo “had inspired our ambition in the law 
 
22 Corbin, supra note 18, at 197. 
23 KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 204. 
24 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917). 
25 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
26 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
27 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
28 See Gilmore, supra note 3, at 1022 n.b. (Editors’ Introduction describing Cardozo’s 
lectures as “the most famous”). See also Clark, supra note 20, at 267 (describing Cardozo’s 
Storrs Lectures as “an historic occasion”). 
29 Clark, supra note 20, at 267. 
30 Clark, supra note 20, at 267. 
31 Corbin, supra note 18, at 197. 
32 Corbin, supra note 18, at 197-98. 
5
Goldstein: The Nature of the Judicial Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
164 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
and had warmed the cockles of our hearts.  Never again have I had a 
like experience,” remarked the man who became one of the leading 
Contracts scholars in American history.33  After the final lecture, the 
faculty insisted that the manuscript be published.  Cardozo protested 
that “If it were published, I would be impeached.”34  He relented, of 
course, Yale University Press published the 180-page book later that 
year, and the rest, as they say, is history.  Cardozo became iconic, not 
impeached. 
II. A SUMMARY OF CARDOZO’S ARGUMENT IN THE NATURE OF 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
Consistent with the invitation as refined and accepted, 
Cardozo’s lectures and eventual book attempted to describe how he 
decided cases.  Judge Jerome Frank later criticized Cardozo for 
ignoring the important work of trial courts,35 but that attack, though 
largely accurate, seems entirely unfair.  Cardozo’s title, The Nature of 
the Judicial Process, certainly misrepresented his topic since the 
assignment given and accepted was far more modest.  Cardozo, an 
appellate judge, made that clear at the outset of his book, beginning in 
its eighth sentence: 
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what 
sources of information do I appeal for guidance? In 
what proportions do I permit them to contribute to the 
result? In what proportions ought they to contribute? If 
a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to follow it? 
If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the rule 
that will make a precedent for the future? If I am 
seeking logical consistency, the symmetry of the legal 
structure, how far shall I seek it? At what point shall the 
quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some 
consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the 
common standards of justice and morals?36 
 
33 Corbin, supra note 18, at 198. 
34 Corbin, supra note 18, at 198. 
35 Jerome Frank, Cardozo and the Upper Court Myth, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369, 373 
(1948) (“Cardozo completely by-passed the operations of the trial courts, as if to say either 
that they had little significance or that their unique decisional activities and distinctive 
functions had no place in that process.”). 
36 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 10. 
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Cardozo’s recurring use of the personal pronoun was suggestive.  
Consistent with the invitation he had ultimately accepted, Cardozo was 
describing how, he, an appellate judge, decided cases. 
Cardozo’s purpose was primarily descriptive, not 
prescriptive.37  He recognized judge-made law as a reality38 and one 
which involved some governing principle,39 although not always the 
same principle for all jurists or even a uniform principle for any one 
judge in every case.40  The principle was sometimes consciously 
chosen and sometimes subconsciously driven,41 yet inherently 
personal.42 
Cardozo thought that generally, some constitutional, statutory 
or common law rule provided a clear and consensus resolution for 
judges regarding most legal questions.43  But on occasion, the law left 
gaps,44 particularly in instances where intention was obscure or where 
legislators had not foreseen a later application,45 a condition especially 
likely in constitutional law.46  When the law left gaps, judges had to 
determine the appropriate legal rules and principles and how to apply 
them.47  In such situations, Cardozo explained that judges did not find 
and apply existing law. They made law,48 they created it, but they did 
so only “interstitially,”49 as Holmes had written four years earlier in 
dissent,50 “between gaps”51 and subject to restraints Cardozo spelled 
out.52 
 
37 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 10. 
38 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 10. 
39 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 11. 
40 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 11. 
41 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 11-12. 
42 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 13. 
43 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 14, 18, 129, 137. 
44 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 14, 69-71. 
45 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 14-15. 
46 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 17. 
47 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 15-16, 17, 28, 129. 
48 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 21, 115, 166. 
49 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 69. 
50 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I 
recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only 
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common law judge could 
not say, ‘I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense, and shall not enforce 
it in my court.’”). 
51 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 113. 
52 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 141. 
7
Goldstein: The Nature of the Judicial Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
166 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
Cardozo suggested four methods judges used: 1) logical 
progression, or the method of philosophy; 2) historical development or 
the method of evolution; 3) community customs, or the method of 
tradition; and 4) justice, morals and social welfare, or the method of 
sociology.53  The method of philosophy had “a certain presumption in 
its favor”54 based on considerations of consistency, fairness, and 
impartiality and to preserve faith that the legal system is legitimate, not 
arbitrary.55  Departures from logic required justification.56  Yet logic 
sometimes pointed in different directions and required judges to 
choose between or accommodate competing legal principles or look to 
some other criteria for guidance.57  Cardozo presented the four 
methods as distinct approaches,58 but suggested that sometimes they 
operated together as when history illuminated logic when 
understanding the rationale animating a rule requires knowledge of its 
origins.59 
Cardozo recognized the importance of history and custom in 
shaping the law.  Yet even though these methods linked law to the past, 
they did not “confine[] the law of the future to uninspired repetition                
of the law of the present and the past.”60  On the contrary, Cardozo 
thought history could illuminate the past and the present, and in so 
doing could guide the future path of the law.61 
The most significant method was not, however, logic or history 
or custom but “the power of social justice,” the method of sociology,62  
what Cardozo sometimes described as “utility, and the accepted 
standards of right conduct.”63  “The final cause of law is the welfare of 
society,” wrote Cardozo, and “[t]he rule that misses its aim cannot 
permanently justify its existence.”64  Cardozo did not suggest that 
judges could routinely ignore existing rules in pursuit of their own 
 
53 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 30-31, 112. 
54 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 31. 
55 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 32-36. 
56 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 33, 35. 
57 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 40-43. 
58 Cf. Corbin, supra note 18, at 199 (stating that Cardozo’s discussion of four methods may 
lead the “unwary” to compartmentalize them rather than see them as part of Cardozo’s 
integrated method). 
59 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 51-52, 55, 65. 
60 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 53. 
61 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 53. 
62 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 65-66. 
63 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 112. 
64 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 66. 
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vision of wisdom.  Rather, he meant that when judges were called upon 
to apply rules to new situations “they must let the welfare of society 
fix the path, its direction and its distance.”65 Cardozo did not believe 
judges had license generally to impose their own conceptions of 
morality.66  Instead, they must apply an objective test and apply the 
views they might reasonably expect a reasonable person to view as 
correct.67  They must adhere to the mores of the day, the temper of the 
times, the morality of “right-minded” contemporaries.68  Ultimately, 
judge-made law must be measured by its consequences.69  A judge-
made rule which experience showed  clashed with the sense of justice 
or did not serve social welfare should be abandoned or fixed,70 
especially when it did not shape the litigants’ conduct.71  Cardozo 
thought precedent should normally command adherence but not when 
experience demonstrated that it was at odds with social welfare.72 
Cardozo saw nothing novel in his depiction of the judicial 
process.73  It had so operated for centuries.74  But whereas fictions had 
traditionally been deployed to conceal this truth,75 transparency had 
more recently replaced concealment as the preferred approach.76 
Cardozo thought candor a virtue in describing the judicial process. 
Cardozo was careful to place his claim regarding judicial law-
making within the context of a legal system that made such activity the 
rare exception, not the rule.  Generally, law was clear and litigation did 
not result.77  When disputes went to court, legal clarity generally gave 
judges no discretion and provided no opportunity for judicial law-
making.  It was only when a dispute exposed a gap in the law that 
judges made law.78  Judicial innovation was confined to a narrow 
space.79 
 
65 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 67. 
66 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 108. 
67 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 89-90, 106, 142. 
68 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 104, 105, 106, 108. 
69 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 102-103, 112-13. 
70 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 150. 
71 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 151. 
72 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 149, 150. 
73 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 116. 
74 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 116, 137-38. 
75 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 116. 
76 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 117. 
77 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 128. 
78 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 129. 
79 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 136-37, 170. 
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Cardozo recognized that judge-made law presented perils, 
including the possibility that judges would act unwisely.80  But 
someone had to exercise the “power of interpretation,” and 
constitutional “custom” had reposed that power with courts,81 he 
concluded, channeling Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 7882 and John 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.83  Cardozo thought judges would 
discharge that function well if they acted conscientiously and 
intelligently.84  The diversity of the bench would also provide a 
corrective. “The eccentricities of judges balance one another,” he 
wrote. 85 And judicial error would be corrected over time in later 
cases.86  The process of continually examining rules against the test 
provided by recurring application would reveal which should survive 
and which should change.87 
Cardozo recognized the problem of applying judge-made rules 
retrospectively.  The fiction that judges always found existing law 
pretended the problem away but candor recognized that gimmick as a 
false resolution.  Some retrospective-application of law was inevitable 
given the law-maker’s inability to anticipate all contingencies.88  
Cardozo concluded that where the law did not provide an applicable 
rule the best course was to entrust resolution to an impartial judge 
based upon what fair and reasonable persons who knew community 
habits and standards of justice would conclude.89  Generally, the result 
so generated would mirror what a statute would have provided.90    
Judges must be translators who could accommodate the law to “the 
spirit of their times.”91  To the extent a judge succeeds in that task, his 
 
80 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 135. 
81 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 135. 
82 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (“The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 
province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a 
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning 
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an 
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity 
ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to 
the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”). 
83 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151 (1803). 
84 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 136. 
85 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 177. 
86 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 178. 
87 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 179. 
88 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 143. 
89 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 142. 
90 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 143. 
91 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 174. 
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work will endure; if he does not, his work will not produce lasting 
rules92 but will yield to his successors’ improved resolutions. 
III.    THE REACTION TO CARDOZO’S BOOK 
   Reviewers of The Nature of the Judicial Process responded 
with effusive praise that mirrored the reactions of those who heard the 
lectures.93   They praised its substance,94 style95 and method.96  Some 
welcomed the book as a pioneering effort of a jurist to explain how 
judges did their work.  Writing in 1921, Harlan Fiske Stone, the Dean 
of Columbia Law School, called it “the first book which has sought in 
simple and understandable language to answer the question, what is 
the intellectual process by which the judge decides a case?”97 
Cardozo’s contribution, Judge Rousseau Burch of the Kansas Supreme 
Court suggested, was not simply to educate the public but to contribute 
to transparency about government.98  Reviewers thought the book 
should be read by judges, lawyers and a lay audience.99 
 
92 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 178. 
93 See, e.g., W. F. Dodd, Book Review, 16 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 710, 710 (1922) (“Seldom in 
a similar space will a student of legal institutions find so much of interest as in these lectures 
of Judge Cardozo. With a wealth of knowledge and a felicity of practical illustration. . . .”); 
id. at 711(“It is impossible in a brief review to do more than call attention to the excellence of 
this little book. Those who do not read it will miss a stimulating contribution to the discussion 
of our legal institutions.”); Thomas Reed Powell, The Behavior of Judges, THE NATION, March 
22, 1922, at 347-48 (calling book a wonderful resource “[f]or those who fear not wisdom.”). 
94 C.M. Hough, Book Review, 7 CORN. L Q. 287, 288 (1922) (stating that “the book will 
enlighten in substance. . . .”). 
95 Id. at 288 (stating the book will “charm in style”). 
96 Rousseau A. Burch, Book Review, 31 YALE L. J. 677, 677 (1922) (“[T]here is nothing new 
in this book but its method.  Elements of the judicial process have been discussed before; but 
this account, although brief, is vivid and complete; although daring, is not sensational or 
exaggerated; although informed by genius and erudition, is lucid enough to be comprehended 
by law-school students; and the account is rendered with a combination of spirit and restraint, 
and with that ‘animated moderation,’ which makes it as brilliant as it is convincing.”). 
97 Harlan Fiske Stone, Book Review, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 382, 382 (1922); see also Nathan 
Isaacs, Book Review, 20 MICH. L. REV. 688, 688 (1922) (“Curiously enough, the literature in 
which judges themselves speak of the processes by which they reach their conclusions is very 
meager.  Of introspective analysis by eminent judges there is practically none. . . . Judge 
Cardozo’s contribution, then, though his subject is as old as the law itself, seems to be a pioneer 
work.”); Learned Hand, Book Review, 35 HARV. L. REV. 479, 480 (1922); Burch, supra note 
95 (calling book a “true” account of judicial process). 
98 Burch, supra note 96, at 677 (“[T]he high priest has not merely come out on the porch of 
the temple to speak to the people, he has taken them inside, and drawn back the veil.  This is 
as it should be.”). 
99 Hough, supra note 94, at 290 (stating that “[l]awyers, and especially judges, ought to 
press this volume onto the reading laity. . . .”); J. Willis Martin, Book Review, 70 U. PA. L. 
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Some, like Judge Learned Hand, credited Cardozo with 
correcting the fiction that judges simply apply pre-existing law.100  
Cardozo also won praise for identifying the various sources judges 
used in deciding.101  Thomas Reed Powell thought it a reflection of 
Cardozo’s wisdom that he identified “the ingredients to be blended” 
rather than a general rule of decision.102  Writing in the American 
Political Science Review in 1922, W. F. Dodd praised Cardozo for 
“draw[ing] aside the veil of judicial sanctity, and show[ing] that judges 
have their views determined by all the influences which control their 
judgment as men and as lawyers.”103   
Stone thought the book cautioned judges and lawyers of the 
limits of logic and history in reaching “dynamic judgment[s]” and 
should lead 
lawyers and students of law to place an appropriate 
emphasis on the study of sociological data and on the 
effort to understand the relation of law to them, because 
by that process we may lay the foundation for a better 
understanding of what social utility is and where in a 
given case the path of social utility lies.104 
But Stone also saw “Cardozo’s restrained and discriminating analysis” 
as a rejoinder of sorts to those who offered sociological jurisprudence 
as a “panacea.”105 
The book enhanced Cardozo’s stature and fame.106  Cardozo 
became a sought-after lecturer.  Five years after its publication, an 
English scholar, Harold J. Laski, quoted it early in a discussion of 
 
REV. 345, 348 (1922) (recommending book for lawyers, law students and laymen); Burch, 
supra note 96, at 680 (recommending book for judges, lawyers, and all interested in public 
affairs). 
100 Hand, supra note 97, at 479. 
101 Hand, supra note 97, at 479 (writing that Cardozo’s “essay tells us of the different factors 
which may properly enter into a judge’s consideration”); Powell, supra note 93, at 347 
(praising Cardozo for identifying “springs of wisdom” from which judges drew). 
102 Powell, supra note 93, at 348. 
103 Dodd, supra note 93, at 710; see also Isaacs, supra note 97, at 689 (calling recognition 
of “subconscious element” in judging Cardozo’s “most important contribution”); Powell, 
supra note 93, at 347 (crediting Cardozo with recognizing “subconscious” element in judging). 
104 Stone, supra note 97, at 384. 
105 Stone, supra note 97, at 384.   
106 Kaufman, supra note 15, at 186; RICHARD POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN 
CARDOZO: PERSONAL VALUES AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS  86 (1997); see also The 
Underwriter, 3 F.2d 483, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1925) (referring to Judge Cardozo’s “thoughtful 
book”). 
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judicial review in England.107  And Cardozo’s prominence contributed 
to the esteem in which the court on which he sat was held.  Judge Irving 
Lehman, Cardozo’s colleague on the New York Court of Appeals and 
friend, attributed the stature of that court prior to 1924 to the fact that 
“students of the law” had read “with glowing enthusiasm” Cardozo’s 
Storrs lectures and his great opinions.108  In 1936, Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone singled out for special praise “that remarkable little volume of 
Mr. Justice Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process” as a source 
of a “new and fruitful conception of law and the lawmaking 
process.”109 
Cardozo’s death in 1938 prompted discussion of his career 
during which, not surprisingly, The Nature of the Judicial Process 
received some attention.  Three leading law reviews published a joint 
tribute in which Justice Harlan Fiske Stone referred to Cardozo’s 
“brilliant essay” in “which he pointed the way to the attainment” of 
molding law “to fulfill the needs of a changing social order.”110 
Cardozo’s essay was “by far the most illuminating discussion of the 
aims and method of sociological jurisprudence that has appeared.  Its 
philosophy and literary merits would have won for him enduring fame, 
apart from his significance as a judge.”111 Frankfurter thought 
Cardozo’s book was “suffused with intimations of what later came 
from his pen as a Justice, as well as glosses upon what is so shyly 
expressed in opinions.”112 
In the years following his death, Cardozo’s successors on the 
Court drew from his book from time to time to support their opinions 
at a time when citation of extra-judicial sources was even more unusual 
than it is today.  Justice Robert Jackson supported the fear expressed 
in his dissent in Korematsu v. United States113 that the Court’s decision 
had “validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal 
procedure and of transplanting American citizens.  The principle then 
 
107 Harold J. Laski, Judicial Review of Social Policy in England, 39 HARV. L. REV. 832, 832 
(1926). 
108 Irving Lehman, Judge Cardozo in the Court of Appeals, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 12, 16 
(1939). 
109 Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20 
(1936). 
110 Harlan Fiske Stone, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1939). 
111 Id. 
112 Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 88, 90 
(1939). 
113 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that 
can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”114  He wrote 
that “[a]ll who observe the work of courts are familiar with what Judge 
Cardozo described as ‘the tendency of a principle to expand itself to 
the limits of its logic.’”115  Justice Jackson also cited Cardozo’s 
comments about judicial law-making in another opinion,116 and Justice 
Hugo Black cited the book regarding the judicial quest for certainty.117  
Justice Frankfurter invoked the book for the proposition that the Court 
must follow clear statutory direction notwithstanding misgivings 
regarding its wisdom.118 
When Yale University Press issued a paperback version in 
1960 (for $.95!), an unsigned review in the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review stated that “it is safe to say that no other American writer 
on legal philosophy and the judicial process has ever produced a work 
which has had so immediate and so lasting an effect on the 
understanding of the legal profession of the workings of the courts and 
the growth of the law.”119  At the time, some 24,805 copies of the book 
had been sold between 1921 and 1960, but that number was dwarfed 
by the 156,637 copies sold the next 34 years after it became available 
 
114 Id. at 246. 
115 Id. (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 51). 
116 State Tax Commission of  Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 201-02 n.23 (1942)                  
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing Cardozo as “another candid jurist” who said “‘I will not 
hesitate in the silence or inadequacy of formal sources to indicate as the general line of 
direction for the judge the following: that he ought to shape his judgment of the law in 
obedience to the same aims which would be those of a legislator who was proposing to himself 
to regulate the question.’”). 
117 Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445, 453-54, n.1 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“‘I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to find how trackless was 
the ocean on which I had embarked. I sought for certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened 
when I found that the quest for it was futile. . . . As the years have gone by, and as I have 
reflected more and more upon the nature of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to 
the uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the 
process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation, and that the doubts and misgivings, 
the hopes and fears, are part of the travail of mind, the pangs of death, and the pangs of birth, 
in which principles that have served their day expire, and new principles are born . . . 
[s]omewhere between worship of the past and exaltation of the present the path of safety will 
be found.’”) (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 166-67). 
118 See Spiegel’s Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 335 U.S. 632, 682 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
119 Book Note, Paperbound Books of Legal Interest, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1174 (1960). 
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in paperback.120  Nearly 18,000 additional paperback copies have 
apparently been sold since 1994.121   
Cardozo’s successors have continued to draw from his book.  
Justice Blackmun’s disappointment with Cardozo’s lectures did not 
preclude him from citing them in support of a living Constitution in his 
Bakke opinion,122 or on two other occasions.123  Justice Brennan 
invoked the book in the majority opinion in Karcher v. Daggett124 for 
its statement of principles of stare decisis, as did the joint opinion of 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,125 and Justice Stevens’s dissent 
in District of Columbia v. Heller.126  In all, 18 justices have authored 
(or co-authored) about 50 opinions citing Cardozo’s book.127  Justice 
Stevens cited it in 16 opinions.  Lower federal and state courts have 
cited the book hundreds of times.  
IV. THE CONTINUING MERIT OF CARDOZO’S CLASSIC 
The Nature of the Judicial Process’s continuing claim to 
attention traces in part to the enormous impact it had on legal thought, 
especially during the first part of the 20th century.   Cardozo’s book 
must be assessed, initially at least, for what it contributed in 1921, not 
based on how it reads nearly a century later.  As Richard Friedman 
correctly observed, “however trite Cardozo’s analysis may appear 
now, clearly it did not when he offered it.”128  Leading jurists and 
 
120 KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 204. 
121 Personal communication from William Frucht, Exec. Editor, Yale University Press, 
(March 13, 2017) (reporting sales of 174,034 paperback books since 1960). 
122 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407-08 (1978) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (“The great generalities of 
the constitution have a content and a significance that vary from age to age.”) (citing CARDOZO, 
supra note 2, at 17). 
123 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 n.13 (1993); 
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 733-34 n.3 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
124 462 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1983). 
125 505 U.S. 833, 843-44, 854 (1992). 
126 554 U.S. 570, 639-40 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
127 I am grateful to my research assistants, Jordan Buchheit and Katie Finnegan for this 
information. 
128 Richard D. Friedman, Cardozo the [Small r] realist, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1738, 1756 
(2000); see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND 
IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980 22 (2001) (stating that subsequent acceptance of 
Cardozo’s approach has obscured the originality and novel quality of his conception). 
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scholars quickly blessed it.129  The Legal Realists built on it, even as 
Cardozo resisted and rejected some of their claims.130  In the 1940s, 
Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson began to cite it in Supreme 
Court opinions.131 
Cardozo’s contribution was, first of all, in making the judicial 
decision-making process more transparent.  Cardozo was the pioneer 
in providing a jurist’s effort to explain how “judges reason.”  The 
unprecedented nature of Cardozo’s work, as well as what he revealed, 
drew attention.  Writing in 1939 following Cardozo’s death, Edwin 
Patterson observed that Cardozo’s “revelations of the judge’s mental 
processes were at the time refreshingly novel, even startling.”132 
Cardozo also dispelled the formalist idea that judges simply 
discovered and applied pre-existing law rather than fashioning it 
themselves.  Four years before Cardozo’s lectures, Holmes had 
memorably written in his dissent in Southern Pacific v. Jensen133 that 
“[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the 
articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be 
identified. . . .”134  Cardozo elaborated on that insight in The Nature of 
the Judicial Process and his discussion of interstitial judicial law-
making, the tools judges used, and the way they used them profoundly 
influenced the thought of a generation of judges, lawyers and law 
students. 
Cardozo’s classic also merits continued attention for a second 
historical reason.  He was among the most significant jurists of the 20th 
 
129 John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1475-75 (1999). 
130 Id. at 1423, 1455-74 (explaining Cardozo’s rejection of Legal Realism). 
131 See supra notes 113-18 and associated text. 
132 Edwin Patterson, Cardozo’s Philosophy of Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 74 (1939) 
(emphasis added); see also KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 2 (“Cardozo’s enduring importance 
arises out of his approach to judging. He was the first modern judge to tell us how he decided 
cases, how he made law, and, by implication, how others should do so.”); POSNER, supra note 
8, at 32 (“The Nature of the Judicial Process is the first systematic effort by a judge to explain 
how judges reason.”); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 965, 971 (1993) (“Cardozo’s lectures were the first serious effort by a sitting judge 
to articulate the sources a judge uses and the reasoning process a judge follows, whether 
consciously or not, in deciding a case.”); Charles E. Clark, Review: Selected Writings of 
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 57 YALE L. J. 658, 660 (1948) (“It is hard for us now to realize just 
how ‘daring’ was the task Cardozo so successfully undertook, for the custom confessions by 
judges had not then become general.  Previously there had been no attempt by an American 
judge to develop a detailed and consistent philosophy of the process of judicial adjudication.”). 
133 224 U.S. 205 (1917). 
134 Id. at 222. 
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century135 and authored many foundational and enduring common law 
and constitutional opinions.  Cardozo was responsible, in the words of 
legal historian William E. Nelson, for “a new understanding of the 
nature of the judicial process” which “has been absorbed into all 
subsequent twentieth-century analyses of the art of judging and has 
become intrinsic to our own thought processes”136  The Nature of the 
Judicial Process was his first, and most extended, discussion of how 
he did his work.  Accordingly, the book merits study for the 
biographical and methodological insights it provides regarding the 
approach to judging of one of America’s greatest and most influential 
jurists.  Not surprisingly, Andrew Kaufman devotes a twenty-three-
page chapter of his seminal biography of Cardozo to the book.137  
Similarly, Judge Posner devotes most of a chapter of about half that 
size to this most important of Cardozo’s non-judicial writings.138 
Yet the book’s enduring significance is not simply or primarily 
for its historical instruction.  Rather, Cardozo’s account continues to 
describe common law judging.139  Notwithstanding societal changes, 
Kaufman, Cardozo’s principal biographer, observes that “most judges 
still go about the job of deciding cases within the framework that 
Cardozo described.”140  In 1980, Judge Frank Coffin, one of the 
outstanding federal appellate judges of the latter part of the 20th 
century, called Cardozo’s “magisterial” book the “paradigm of judicial 
self analysis.”141  Judge John Noonan of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote in 1998 that Cardozo had provided 
 
135 John C. P. Goldberg, Community and the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing 
Cardozo’s Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1324 (1990) (“Benjamin Cardozo’s 
standing as a great judge is secure.”). 
136 NELSON, supra note 128, at 22. 
137 See KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 199-222. 
138 See POSNER, supra note 8, at 20-32. 
139 KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 199 (stating that Cardozo’s “enduring importance” was in 
his “approach to judging” as described in The Nature of the Judicial Process); see also 
Friedman, supra note 128, at 1751 (stating general agreement with Kaufman on this point); 
Friedman, supra note 128, at 1756 (stating that Cardozo’s “perspective continues to offer a 
useful guide to judging.”). 
140 KAUFMAN, supra note 5, at 200; see also Friedman, supra note 128, at 1756-57. 
141 FRANK COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE 
BENCH 12 (1980). 
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“the best account of the judge’s job” in his book.142  No wonder judges 
read the book.143 
To be sure, some jurists like Justices Frankfurter and Blackmun 
and Judges Posner and Friendly suggested that Cardozo’s book is not 
very helpful in deciding actual cases.144  This complaint misses the 
mark since it ignores his essential message.  As Paul A. Freund pointed 
out, it is unfair to critique Cardozo for not prescribing a ready-made 
methodology to approach all cases since “no formulae could be 
adequate and one should not expect to find ready-made, convertible 
answers.”145  Cardozo did not view judging as formulaic.  Uncertainty 
was an inherent part of the enterprise.146 Amidst this uncertainty, 
Cardozo identified the interpretive aids but thought the manner, 
sequence and amount of their use would depend on changing context 
and would need to be managed by each judge.  Judging was more art 
than science and every judge would have to produce their own 
synthesis.   
Yet if judging was an art, Cardozo viewed making sense of law 
as a scientific enterprise.  Cardozo thought judges should decide hard 
cases in accordance with social justice and social consequence, but 
believed those directions could be derived scientifically by attention to 
social mores and the lessons of a process of trial and error.147   
Cardozo’s book is about the nature of the law judges apply as 
well as about the nature of their judicial decision-making process.  
Cardozo’s insight, that judges make law, may now seem trite—that is, 
 
142 John T. Noonan, Jr., Sitting in Judgment, N. Y. TIMES, June 21, 1998; see also David A. 
Nelson, The Nature of the Judicial Process: Revisited, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 563, 578 (1995) 
(arguing that Cardozo accurately described judicial process in The Storrs Lectures). 
143 Abrahamson, supra note 132, at 973 (Wisconsin Supreme Court justice stating she 
reread the book upon becoming judge); see, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF THE NEW YORK COURTS, http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-
history-new-york/luminaries-court-appeals/cardozo-benjamin.html (last visited July 20, 2017) 
(“To this day Cardozo’s exposition of the nature of the judicial process and the growth of the 
law remains new and exciting.  It’s an excellent read!”); Charles E. Clark and David M. 
Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law 
Tradition, 71 YALE L. J. 255, 255 (1961) (stating that a “rereading . . . gives a sense of renewed 
life, of complete modernity, to their central thesis.”); John Van Voorhis, Cardozo and the 
Judicial Process Today, 71 YALE L. J. 202, 202 (1961) (reports rereading book “many times”); 
Clark, supra note 132, at 660 (stating that “The Nature of the Judicial Process still remains as 
the best analysis we have of the judge at work.”). 
144  See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. 
145 Paul A. Freund, Foreword: Homage to Mr. Justice Cardozo, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4 
(1979). 
146 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 166-67. 
147 NELSON, supra note 128, at 23-24. 
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after all what classics do, they make the extraordinary familiar.  Yet 
often forgotten is his related, but important, point that generally the 
law is clear and gives rise to little controversy.148  For most people, 
lawsuits are rare and dreaded experiences which turn on factual, not 
legal, disputes so the law often provides no gaps for judges to fill.149  
Judicial lawmaking was the exception, not the rule. 
That characterization of law in America remains valid even 
though law school and political discussion obscure this truth by 
focusing on the high profile, 5-4 decisions, the hard or very hard, cases. 
One can recognize as consequential the choices different judges make 
(and accordingly, the choice of different judges) without denying the 
overwhelming consensus in the legal system.  Even at the Supreme 
Court, where controversial issues are addressed, most justices agree 
most of the time.  Justices Thomas and Ginsburg voted together 65% 
of the time on cases the Court decided during the October 2016 term 
and most of the justices agreed with most of their other colleagues 
more than 75% of the time.150   
Notwithstanding the recurring promises of some presidential 
candidates and presidents to appoint judges who will apply the law, 
not make it, that dichotomy lacks real meaning and is more misleading 
than instructive.  Much law is certain, but Cardozo pointed out that 
human fallibility prevents a legal system from anticipating every 
situation or always crafting the right rule initially.151  When the 
inevitable gaps occasionally arise, jurists must choose between 
pretending existing law furnishes the answer or providing one, from 
following unworkable precedent or changing course.  In either case, 
judicial creativity occurs but only with candor when the reality of 
judicial law-making is recognized, not concealed.   
Cardozo’s enduring contribution was, in part, in providing a 
basis for a judicial process based on transparency and honesty rather 
 
148 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 128. 
149 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 128-29. 
150 SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK OCTOBER TERM 2016, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/SB_Stat_Pack_2017.06.28.pdf.  A couple of caveats are in order.  
First, Justice Neil Gorsuch participated in a small number of decisions.  His presence for an 
entire term may introduce more disagreement although should not change the general point 
being made.  More significantly, although the statistics regarding voting by Supreme Court 
justices shows overwhelming agreement, the fact that 79% of decided cases from lower federal 
and state courts are reversed whereas only 21% are affirmed shows a degree of disagreement 
in these cases. See id. at 3.  Of course, the cases the Court accepts for review are a tiny and 
unrepresentative set of judicial decisions. 
151 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 143-45. 
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than one based on the fiction that judges applied, but never made, law.  
Yet that insight was only part of the continuing legacy of The Nature 
of the Judicial Process.  Cardozo also articulated a vision of the role 
of the judge in a pluralistic and changing society.  As John Goldberg 
has pointed out, Cardozo saw the common law judge as performing an 
important function in identifying and propagating the norms citizens 
share by carefully navigating between following existing doctrine and 
adapting judge-made law to maintain its consistency with changing 
moral beliefs.152   
In order to manage this challenge successfully, Cardozo 
believed judges needed to balance competing perspectives.  They 
could not be indifferent to the past but neither could they feel shackled 
to it.  They must be sensitive to received legal concepts but they could 
not confine their attention to legal categories while ignoring “the ever-
evolving social world around them.”153 They must be, Cardozo 
thought, in touch with their times154 and seek to give voice to “the 
aspirations and convictions and philosophies” of the people of their 
time.155  Judges must understand the prevailing norms of their society 
so they could craft legal doctrine in a pragmatic manner based on them, 
not simply apply their own moral views in an imperious manner.156 
Cardozo believed that in making law judges should be attentive 
to the consequences of alternative courses; they must be pragmatic.157  
History furnished a laboratory to help inform that assessment.  Judicial 
conclusions should undergo “constant testing and retesting, revision 
and readjustment.”158  Rules, having been “duly tested by experience,” 
should be abandoned if they failed to accord with justice or social 
welfare.159  To be sure, some subjectivity was inevitable since every 
judge experiences the world personally.  Yet judges should aspire to 
 
152 Goldberg, Community and the Common Law Judge, supra note 135, at 1327; see also 
John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1458 (1999) (stating that 
Cardozo structured book around tension between law’s need for “conceptual coherence” and 
adaptation). 
153 Goldberg, The Life of the Law, supra note 152, at 1458. 
154 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 174. 
155 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 173. 
156 Goldberg, The Life of the Law, supra note 152, at 1459-61. 
157 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 102-03. 
158 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 136. 
159 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 150. 
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be “translators” of their times,160 and they could not serve this function 
if they were always looking backwards.   
Cardozo provided an enduring description of the common law 
process yet the method he presented did not simply describe the work 
of judges regarding the common law subjects.  For instance, Cardozo’s 
approach speaks to contemporary discussions in constitutional law 
between originalists and those who favor a living, or common law, 
constitution.  In his recent book, The Living Constitution,161 and in 
other writings,162 David Strauss, the leading academic proponent of a 
“living constitution,” draws from Cardozo regarding the common law 
approach to constitutional interpretation.  Strauss explains that when 
constitutional precedents are not clear, judges often decide based on  
fairness and social policy.  Like Cardozo, Strauss cautions against over 
(or under)-stating the role of such judgments and draws on Cardozo, 
“one of the greatest American common law judges,” by quoting a 
passage from Cardozo’s second lecture confirming that judges 
consider considerations of social welfare in expanding or restricting 
the reach of existing rules.163  Echoing Cardozo, Strauss points out that 
in “well-functioning legal system[s]” most disputes are not litigated, 
that clear rules govern the few that are, and that precedents restrict the 
area and outcomes for a judge’s social policy judgments.164  Strauss 
illustrates the point by drawing from MacPherson v. Buick.165  
Elsewhere, Strauss refers to The Nature of the Judicial Process as “the 
leading statement of the common law approach” in the 20th century and 
one which emphasizes “the importance of innovation.”166 
One might frame the modes of legal reasoning differently than 
the four methods Cardozo identified.  Others have.  Yet Cardozo 
 
160 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 174. 
161 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 39 (2010). 
162 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877 (1996). 
163 STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 161, at 39 (“The final cause of law is 
the welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its                  
existence. . . . [But] I do not mean, of course, that judges are commissioned to set aside existing 
rules at pleasure in favor of any other set of rules which they may hold to be expedient or wise. 
I mean that when they are called upon to say how far existing rules are to be extended or 
restricted, they must let the welfare of society fix the path, its direction and its distance.”) 
(quoting CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 67). 
164 STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 161, at 39. 
165 STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 161, at 39. 
166 Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 162, at 888; see also 
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 162, at 900 n.54 (calling it 
the “leading modern statement of the common law approach”). 
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identified the various instruments—logic, philosophy, tradition, 
history, moral and social consequences—at the root of modern 
approaches, and suggested that  judicial reasoning was pluralistic, not 
single-factored.   
The reputation and unique talent of Cardozo, and the 
interaction between those variables, explains in part why The Nature 
of the Judicial Process retains contemporary resonance nearly a 
century after it was written.  Yet part of the reason the book had such 
impact in 1921 and ever since is that our greatest common law jurist 
used common law-like tools in constructing it.  Like the common law’s 
greatest decisions, Cardozo’s most significant insights in his book 
were not sprung without any warning on a surprised public.  Rather, 
like the common law, he took emerging insights which were tested by 
experience and formulated them in a convincing manner.  Grant 
Gilmore said Cardozo’s confession that judges sometimes made law 
“was widely regarded as a legal version of hard-core pornography,”167 
but this characterization is more catchy than correct.  The idea Cardozo 
embraced, that judges sometimes made law, was controversial but 
plausible in 1921, and had respected advocates like Holmes and 
Roscoe Pound.  It is no disparagement of Cardozo that he adopted ideas 
others had previously advanced.  His genius in the Storrs Lecture, like 
that of the common law, was in distinguishing the unworkable 
products of the past from its promising ideas, in translating the latter 
into changing times, and articulating them in a way that resonated with 
his readers.  Like the common law, The Nature of the Judicial Process 
performed this task of synthesizing law through sensitivity to 
experience and to the needs of changing times.   
Much as the common law process continually tests rules and 
principles against different fact patterns, Cardozo’s four lectures 
repeatedly returned to  examine the same basic premises and ideas 
from different angles.  Cardozo’s first lecture (and chapter) introduced 
his topic and discussed “The Method of Philosophy.”  The second 
addressed the other three “Methods,” of “History, Tradition and 
Sociology.”  Chapter three returns to the “Method of Sociology” and 
takes a focused look at “The Judge as a Legislator.” And although the 
role of precedent was implicated in the first three discussions, in 
chapter four Cardozo takes a focused look at “Adherence to Precedent” 
as well as “The Subconscious Element in the Judicial Process” in 
 
167 Gilmore, supra note 3, at 1033. 
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concluding.  In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Cardozo constantly 
revisits his core ideas, considering themes previously presented in the 
new context of the subject then under discussion, measuring their 
validity from different angles and distance, and against fresh 
objections.  Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote that Justice 
Louis D. Brandeis was a master of the microscope and the telescope,168 
but Cardozo demonstrates his own facility in putting those judicial 
tools to scholarly use as, in common law-like fashion, he varies his 
perspective to illuminate his subject in its detail and generality.  Like 
the common law, Cardozo’s method in his classic involves a continual 
exchange between particular and general and continual testing and 
retesting of ideas to measure their validity. 
Like the common law, Cardozo’s approach in The Nature of 
the Judicial Process was balanced and pragmatic.  Cardozo’s content 
and tone is progressive, yet moderate, not disruptive.  He recognizes 
the necessity and inevitability of change yet confines judicial creativity 
to law’s gaps while recognizing that most doctrine the judge finds will 
be applied and perpetuated.  Like the common law, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process recognizes that law must change to accommodate 
new social norms yet it values stability, familiarity, predictability and 
justice by generally deferring to inherited rules. 
And like the common law, Cardozo took emerging ideas and 
provided the justifications and context to help make them consensus.  
The greatness in Cardozo’s discussion was reflected in the fact that it 
was fresh enough to impart new insights yet balanced and persuasive 
enough to allow his nomination to the Supreme Court a decade later to 
succeed Holmes to be the product of widespread demand. 
Cardozo’s judicial approach may have been better suited to his 
age than to modern times given the greater degree of consensus that 
then existed.  Yet his classic continues to provide a true and candid 
account of the nature of an important part of the judicial process. 
 
Cardozo closed his Lectures and book as follows: 
 
The future, gentlemen, is yours. We have been 
called to do our parts in an ageless process. 
Long after I am dead and gone, and my little 
 
168 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 3 (Felix 
Frankfurter, ed., 1932). 
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part in it is forgotten, you will be here to do your 
share, and to carry the torch forward. I know 
that the flame will burn bright while the torch is 
in your keeping.169 
As The Nature of the Judicial Process nears its centennial, we 
can safely conclude that Cardozo clearly understated the enduring          
light his contributions have provided. How much illumination his 
successors provide remains to be seen. 
 
 
169 CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 179-80. 
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